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Banks v. Dretke
124 S. Ct. 1256 (2004)

L Facts
Police discovered 16-year-old Richard Whitehead's body on April 14,1980.
Two witnesses reported seeing Whitehead in the company of Delma Banks on
the night of April 11. On April 23 a confidential informant contacted lead
investigator Deputy Sheriff Willie Huff and reported that Banks would be
traveling to Dallas to meet an individual and to procure a weapon. That night,
officers followed Banks to a South Dallas residence. On the return trip, police
stopped Banks's car and discovered a handgun. Police arrested the occupants of
the vehicle. Huff later returned to the South Dallas residence, where he met and
interviewed Charles Cook, and recovered a second gun. Cook informed Huff
that Banks had left the gun with him earlier in the week. Tests identified the
second gun as the weapon used in Whitehead's murder.'
Following a pretrial hearing in May 1980, the prosecution advised Banks's
counsel that "[the State] will, without necessity of motions provide you with all
discovery to which you are entitled." 2 At trial, Cook testified for the prosecution.3 On cross-examination, Cook stated three times that he had not talked to
anyone about his trial testimony.4 In fact, Cook had participated in at least one
practice session, during which "prosecutors intensively coached" him regarding
his testimony and appearance at trial. 5 Nonetheless, the prosecution "allowed
Cook's misstatements to stand uncorrected" and told the jury in summation that
"Cook brought you [the] absolute truth."6
The prosecution also called Robert Farr as a witness at trial. On crossexamination, Farr testified that he had not taken any money from police officers
and had not given officers a statement. In truth, Farr was a paid informant, but
again, the prosecution did not correct Farr's untrue statements. The prosecution
called Farr to the stand during the penalty phase. Defense counsel twice asked
Farr whether he had informed Huff of the Dallas trip. Each time Farr answered
no, and the prosecution let the perjured testimony stand. Further, the prosecution emphasized the truthfulness and significance of Farr's testimony.7
1.
2.
3.
4.

Banks v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 1256, 1263-64 (2004).
Id at 1264 (alteration in original).
Id
Id.

5.
6.
7.

Id
Id
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1263-67.
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The jury sentenced Banks to death, and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied Banks's direct appeal.8 In state postconviction proceedings,
Banks alleged that the prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation
of Brady v.Mayland by failing to reveal that Farr was, and lied about being, a paid
informant and that Cook lied about his coached testimony."° The state
postconviction court denied the petition." On March 7, 1996, Banks filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District ofTexas. In February of 1999 Banks proffered affidavits from
Farr and Cook in support of a request for discovery and hearing. 3 The magistrate judge ordered disclosure of the district attorney's files, and a 74-page
transcript of one of Cook's interrogations surfaced. 14 The document provided
compelling evidence that prosecutors had coached Cook in preparation for trial.'"
The district court held that Banks had not properly pled a Brady claim with
respect to the Cook transcript and, therefore, had procedurally defaulted the
claim.' 6 Accordingly, the district court dismissed the claim and also denied Banks
a certificate of appealability ("COA").'7 With respect to the Farr claim, the
district court adopted the Magistrate's report and recommendation that habeas
corpus relief be granted with respect to Banks's death sentence but not his
conviction.' 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court's grant of relief on the Farr claim and affirmed the court's denial
of the COA.' 9 Faced with a March 12,2003 execution date, Banks petitioned the
8.

Id. at 1267; Banks v. State, 643 S.W.2d 129, 135 (F1ex. Crim. App. 1982).

9.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

10.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1267; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) (holding that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment").
11.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1268.
12.
Id. Because the petition was filed prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), it was governed by pre-AEDPA
procedural rules. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000)
(setting out the guidelines for a federal court to hear a state daim on a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus; part of AEDPA).
13.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1268. Farr explained his work as an informant. Id He admitted
setting up Banks's arrest because he feared arrest on drug charges if he did not help Huff. Id.at
1267-68. Cook recalled that in a practice session, "prosecutors told him to testify 'as they wanted
[him] to, and that [he] would spend the rest of [his] life in prison if [he] did not.' " Id at 1268.
(alteration in original).
14.
Id.at 1268-69.
15.
Id.at 1269.
16.
Id.
at 1269-70.
17.
Id.
at 1270.

18.

Id. at 1269.

19.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1270; Banks v. Cockrell, 48 Fed. Appx. 104 (5th Cir. 2002) (opinion
not selected for publication).
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United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on four issues. 20 The
Supreme Court stayed Banks's execution on March 12, 2003 and on April 21
granted his petition on three of the four claims.2 1
II. Hol&ng
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for
further proceedings.Y The Court held that Banks satisfied the elements of Brady
as to the Farr Brady claim.' The Court also concluded that a COA should have
issued for the Cook Brady claim. ' Thus, the Court granted relief and remanded
the Cook Brady claim for further proceedings. 2
III. Analysis
A. FarrBrady Claim
The Supreme Court first concluded that Banks satisfied the state court
exhaustion requirement as to the legal ground for the Farr claim.26 However, in
the state habeas proceeding, Banks did not produce evidence that Farr served as
a police informant.27 As a result, the burden fell on Banks to show that he was
not procedurally barred from presenting such evidence in federal habeas proceedings.' He was entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing only if he showed
cause for his failure to develop the facts in the state proceeding and prejudice
resulting from that failure.'

20. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1271. Two of the four issues, the tenability of the Farr Brady claim
and the question as to the Cook transcript suppression claim, are the focus of this case note. Banks
also raised a penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim and a claim of improper exclusion
of minority jurors. Id The Court denied Banks's petition as to the improper juror exclusion claim.
Id. Because the court concluded that a writ of habeas corpus should have issued with respect to
Banks's Farr Brady claim, the Court did not address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id Any relief would have been cumulative. Id at 1271 n.10.
21.
Id; Banks v. Cockrell, 538 U.S. 977, 977 (2003).
22. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1280-81.
23. Id at 1279.
24. Id at 1280.
25. Id at 1280-81.
26. Id at 1271; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus "shall not
be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, or there is an absence of available State corrective process; or circumstances exist that
render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant").
27. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1272.
28. Id
29. Id; see Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (holding that in order to receive
an evidentiary hearing a habeas petitioner must show cause for his failure to develop properly the
factual basis of a claim in state court and actual prejudice resulting therefrom).

94
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The Court conflated the test for cause and prejudice with two of the
required elements of a meritorious Brady claim.3" First, the Court discussed the
three elements of a Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim as set forth in Strickler
v. Greene.3 The evidence must be favorable to the accused, must 3have
been
2
suppressed by the State, and as a result, prejudice must have ensued.
Banks satisfied the "favorable" requirement because Farr's status as a paid
informant clearly supported Banks's attack on his credibility.33 Next, the Court
determined that if Banks demonstrated "cause and prejudice," he would also4
succeed in establishing the remaining two elements of the Farr Brady claim.
Corresponding to the second Brady element, Banks could show cause if his
reason for not producing factual support in the state proceeding was the State's
suppression of the relevant evidence.35 The Supreme Court analyzed the Strickler
decision and found that three factors accounted for the Court's determination
that the petitioner showed cause for his failure to raise a Brady claim in state
court.36 The prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence, the petitioner reasonably relied on the prosecution's open-file policy, and the State confirmed that
reliance by asserting
that the prosecution disclosed all information known to the
7
government.
The Supreme Court concluded that Banks's case was "congruent with
Strickler" on all three counts.3" The prosecution knew of Farr's paid informant
status, asserted that it would disclose all Brady material, and confirmed Banks's
reliance on that disclosure by denying Banks's specific assertion that Fair was a
paid informant.39 In addition, Farr repeatedly responded untruthfully at trial, and
the prosecution knowingly allowed the false statements to stand.4' Based on this
record, the Court held that Banks's case was stronger than that in Stricklerand
that Banks therefore established cause for his failure to present the evidence in
the state court.4'
30.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1272.
31.
Id.; see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999) (holding that the petitioner did not
procedurally default a Brady claim by failing to raise the claim until federal habeas proceedings when
exculpatory evidence was not disclosed and when defense counsel reasonably relied on prosecution's open file policy).
32.
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.
33.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1272.
34.
Id
35.
Id.
36.
Id.at 1273 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289).
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1267, 1273.
40.
Id.at 1264-66, 1273-74.
41.
Id.at 1273-74.
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The Court then explained that Banks could establish prejudice if the suppressed evidence was "material" for Brady purposes.4 2 The Court cited the
standard for materiality set forth in Kyles v. Wbitey. 4' A petitioner must show a
" 'reasonable probability of a different result' "had the evidence been disclosed
to the jury.' The Court applied this test to the facts underlying Banks's claim. 5
First, the prosecution itself acknowledged Farr's critical role.' Second, Farr
instigated the South Dallas excursion that produced important evidence at both
the guilt and sentencing phases. 4 Third, because Banks had no criminal record,
Farr's testimony regarding Banks's propensity to commit future violent crimes
was crucial in satisfying the prosecution's penalty phase burden to show Banks's
dangerousness.48 On these facts the Court easily concluded that had jurors
known of Farr's interest in maintaining Huff's favor, they might have distrusted
and possibly disregarded his testimony.49 This conclusion was reinforced by the
trial court's failure to give the
cautionary jury instructions that normally accom50
pany informant testimony.
As a result, the Court determined that, at least in the penalty phase, "one
[could] hardly be confident that Banks received a fair trial, given the jury's
ignorance of Farr's true role in the investigation and trial of the case."" Because
Banks established a meritorious Brady claim, he also established the cause and
52
prejudice required to overcome a procedural default.
Accordingly, the Supreme
53
relief.
habeas
to
entitled
was
he
that
Court held
B. Cook Brady Claim
The district court denied Banks's Cook Brady claim after it ruled that Banks
should have amended his 1996 habeas petition to include the 1999 discovery of
42.
Id. at 1276-79; see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that
exculpatory evidence withheld by the prosecution "is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different") (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
43.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1276; see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1995) (holding that
the prosecutor is responsible for making sure that evidence that would create a reasonable probability of a different result is available to the defense).
44.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1276 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434).
45.
Id. at 1276-79.
46.
Id.at 1277.
47.
Id.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 1278.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1278.
Id.
at 1279.
Id.
Id.
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the Cook transcript as grounds for relief.' In response, Banks urged that the
Brady claim had been raised by implied consent pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(b). 5 However, the district court and later the Fifth
Circuit con6
cluded that Rule 15o(b) was inapplicable in habeas proceedings.
The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion as contrary to its decision in
Harris v. Nelson, 7 which stated that the use of Rule 15(b) in habeas proceedings
is " 'noncontroversial.' "" The Court noted that Banks raised the issue of the
undisclosed Cook transcript before the magistrate judge. 9 The Court then
equated such an evidentiary hearing with a trial for the purposes of Rule 15(b).'
Consistent with Rule 15(b), therefore, the issue had been "tried by express or
implied consent of the parties" and should have been treated as if it had been
& 2
raised in the pleadings.61 Finally, the Supreme Court cited Miller-El v. Cockrel
for the proposition that in order for a COA to issue, a prisoner must demonstrate only that" 'jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.' ,63 The
Supreme Court held that Banks satisfied this standard with respect to the district
court's Rule 15(b) ruling and that a COA should have issued.64
IV. Application in Virginia
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of Banks's Cook
Brady claim, the Court's discussion of that aspect of the case may have far

54.
Id at 1269-70.
55.
Id at 1270; see FED. K CIV. P. 15(b) (providing that "[w]hen issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings").
56.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1279.
57.
394 U.S. 286 (1969).
58.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1279 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 n.5 (1969)); see
Harris,394 U.S. at 300 (holding that, "where specific allegations before the court show reason to
believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is
confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the
necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry").
59.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1280.
60.
Id
61.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b) ("When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.").
62.
537 U.S. 322 (2003).
63.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1280 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)); see
Miler-El,537 U.S. at 336-37 (clarifying the procedure for determining whether to grant a COA).
64.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1280.
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reaching implications for future Brady claims.65 The Supreme Court strongly
suggested that the suppressed evidence relating to both Farr and Cook was Brady
material. In the opening paragraphs of BanksJusticeGinsburg presented a walkthrough of the opinion." The State advised defense counsel that it would,
without the need for a defense motion, provide the discovery to which the
defense was entitled.67 The State "did not disclose" Farr's paid informant status
or the pretrial transcript that revealed Cook had been intensely coached."69
Finally, the prosecution failed to correct false statements by both witnesses.
The Court concluded that "[wihen police or prosecutors conceal significant
exculpatory or impeaching material in the State's70 possession, it is ordinarily
incumbent on the State to set the record straight.,
This conclusion is unremarkable as applied to the Farr claim. However,
when applied to the Cook claim, Banks suggests that the commonplace practice
of coaching a witness prior to his trial testimony can produce exculpatory and
impeachment evidence under Brady. The Court's emphasis on the prosecution's
failure to turn over the Cook transcript and the failure to correct Cook's statements that he had not been coached strongly suggests that the Court found a
duty to disclose under Brady.
For example, in the process of coaching a witness toward particular trial
testimony, the prosecution may also deflect the witness from statements that do
not fit comfortably with the prosecution's case. Banks strongly suggests that
when such retooling of a witness's trial testimony occurs, the changes in the
testimony must be disclosed to the defense. Taking the next logical step, Banks
impliedly represents an expansion of Brady to include all exculpatory and impeachment evidence gathered during witness preparation. 7' Further, when a
coached witness states at trial that his testimony was not rehearsed, the prosecution has a duty to correct the record.
Notably, the facts of Banks implicated the two interrelated doctrines of
Brady and perjured testimony under Napue v. Illinois2 and Giglio v. United States.7
65.
66.

Id at 1279-80.
Id.
at 1263.

67.

Id

68.
Id
69.
Id
70.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1263.
71.
Prosecutors may argue that preparation evidence is protected by the work product
doctrine. However, transcripts ofwitness preparation, unlike the prosecution's interrogation notes,
are unlikely to fall under work product. For a discussion of the work product doctrine in this
context, see generally Jannice Joseph, The New Russian Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DE. J. 33
(2004).
72.
360 U.S. 264 (1959).
73.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1271 n. 11; seeNapue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (stating that
convictions obtained by soliciting false evidence, or failing to correct the erroneous impression false

CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

Banks presents a clear case of prosecutorial misconduct. 74 The prosecution
knowingly allowed Farr and Cook to testify untruthfully, and the State continued,
through direct and collateral appeal proceedings, to suppress and deny the
truth.75 However, because the Court disposed of the case on the Farr Brady
claim, the Supreme Court did not address the issue raised in the Fifth Circuit as
to whether a perjury claim, to warrant adjudication, must be pleaded separately
from a Brady claim.76
Banks provides a powerful caution for the prosecutors. At the same time,
defense counsel should remember that positive reliance on the prosecution's
open file policy does not necessarily ensure that the defendant will receive all
Brady material to which he is entitled. Even when the prosecution volunteers
77
Brady material, due diligence in investigation remains essential.
V. Conclusion
Although the Court disposed of Banks's Cook Brady claim by remanding to
the Fifth Circuit for further consideration, Banks's effects on Brady may be farreaching. Banks impliedly added witness preparation to the range of possible
Brady material. This expansion of Brady suggests that the circumstances surrounding a witness's pretrial interrogation and trial preparation may constitute
exculpatory material.

Jessica M. Tanner

evidence creates at trial, may not stand); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (stating
"that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is

incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice') (citation omitted).
74.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1263-67, 1273-79.
75.
Id.at 1263-66.
76.
Id.at 1271 n.11.
77.
For a complete discussion of the effect of Banks on Brady claims, see generally Joseph,
supra note 71.

